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Introduction
Not all information that affects voters’ preferences is necessarily available individually to
each of them prior to an election. This is one reason why political participation is important: to
aggregate the individual pieces of information held by voters. Even if all voters are not perfectly
informed, the electoral outcome might contain the information they collectively hold. Condorcet
(1785) is the first study of this question, but recent work by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)
has subtly refocused it. They show that, with two policy alternatives, absolute participation
by all members in society is not necessarily relevant: less informed members can delegate their
vote via abstention to more informed voters.
However, in actual elections voters rarely pick among policies, but among candidates who
run to win an election. A less explored avenue of research is whether voters can trust candidates’
ambition to win to become informed of all they need to know. In this approach what is critical
is for candidates to be forced to reveal what they know to win the election. Voters are a passive
third party and information is a side product that “trickles” down to them because of, in the
subtle words of spanish folk wisdom, the competition “between hienas and jackals”.
In this paper I study if electoral competition makes candidates reveal information that
voters value. Moreover, I allow candidates to offer platforms covering many issues at a time.
To allow candidates to compete on many issues at a time when both are observed to be iden-
tical (apart from the platforms they offer) is normally problematic. For example, the standard
Downsian model is generally prediction-free when platforms are defined in a multidimensional
space, as it lacks Nash equilibria. In this paper I show that the presence of asymmetric in-
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formation between candidates and voters determines equilibria can exist in a Downsian model
where multiple issues are voted at once even if candidates are ex-ante identical.
The reason is that the election has an added value. Beyond the disagreement among voters
in multidimensional space, it offers a way to pick the best among two candidates. 1 Even if voters
cannot identify him prior to the election, they expect one candidate to be qualitatively better
than the other on average, and voters get an added value from electing him that overcomes the
level of disagreement among them in multidimensional space. For simplicity I assume that all
voters share in common the value from the better candidate. However, the argument can be
generalized: it need not be absolute, it is enough that a minority that is pivotal as in Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1996) shares the common value.
The model assumes six stylized facts characteristic of most US Presidential elections: (i)
there are two parties/candidates, (ii) they are long-lived, (iii) the winner is elected by majority
rule, there is unrestricted competition over many issues at a time, (iv) some among which voters
disagree, (v) others among which they do not, and (vi) prior to the election, not all information
that voters value is available to them. In particular, information is qualitative: it is relevant
not for issues that are positional or relative, but for those in which voters can agree as better
or worse about a candidate, i.e. a good record of economic performance, reducing crime or,
instead, having been unable to deal with corrupt subordinates. That is, there is a qualitative
dimension to candidates that is not observable prior to the election and the election is the
mechanism through which it is revealed.
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This is a Downsian model and as such it shares the central prediction of the classic one-
dimensional model: a strong tendency for policy to converge to the median point (in this case
a generalized median, as the policy space is multidimensional). However, there need not be
full convergence: the expected difference in quality among candidates dictates how far can the
winner’s platform be from the median. Moreover, divergence is found in other models, but
here it is based on Donald Stokes’ claim that changes in policy can be unrelated to changes in
the voting distribution (contrary to the classic Downsian model). Instead, and Stokes (1963)
provides evidence to this effect, they can be determined by changes in the quality of elected
officials.
Practical use of information is not something new in elections. Qualitative differences
between candidates not observable prior to the election are common. An example is found in
the summer of 1858, when Abraham Lincoln campaigned against Stephen Douglas in Illinois to
be elected to the Senate. Some time that summer Lincoln must have realized that the election
could be used to reveal information for the coming presidential election of 1860. Slavery at that
time was already one of the most contentious issues in American politics. Lincoln’s strategy
was to force Douglas to answer if he would accept if citizens of new states excluded slavery
from extending to their state. Douglas answered affirmatively and managed to retain his Illinois
seat. He also managed to divide the Democratic party along Northern and Southern lines. The
South nominated another Democratic candidate in 1860 and Lincoln won the presidency.
As Riker (1986) reveals, the qualitative (or valence) issue was not Lincoln’s stand on slavery.
Douglas also supported exclusion, and the country itself was divided. What is exemplar of
Lincoln’s political skill was his strategy to force Democratic candidates to reveal their individual
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stand on slavery: the party at that time was not united. Lincoln managed to collect more votes
than Douglas even if both stood for the same policy because Democratic partisanship faltered
when forced to divide its vote.
Related Literature
Recent literature (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, and Razin, 2003) has analyzed
elections where voters are not fully informed about some event that affects their preferences. In
Condorcet (1785)’s vein, this literature sees elections as a mechanism to aggregate the bits and
pieces of information dispersed among the population by voting. In this paper I instead study if
electoral competition makes candidates reveal information that voters value. Previous literature
(see Ledyard, 1989) has analyzed party competition to reveal information; but information
that affects the preferences of candidates. Both here and in the literature on participation,
information is modelled as a common value among voters (see Milgrom and Weber, 1982), i.e.
a realization of a state of the world that affects the utility of all voters. Table 1 summarizes
this first literature to which this paper belongs to.
The paper is also a contribution in the field of spatial elections defined in a multidimensional
space (see Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999, and the references therein). The traditional way out
of the existence problem is to argue that either there are institutional structures that determine
that issues are only voted one at a time (see Shepsle, 1979), that voter actions are probabilistic
(see Davis et al., 1970), that candidates cannot commit to any but their ideal point (see Besley
and Coate, 1997), or that different platforms cannot be compared (see Roemer, 2001).
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Instead, the seminal analysis of a multidimensional election with perfect information and a
common value is Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000). They prove that an equilibrium exists if the
common value (the “valence” or relative quality of a candidate) is larger than some minimal
bound, the radius of the “yolk” (see McKelvey, 1986). Here I recast the multidimensional
existence problem as a result of voter disagreement in multidimensional space with majority
rule. The well-known Plott (1967) conditions then provide a measure of disagreement among
voters’ ideal points. When they hold, there is zero disagreement among voters, and a Nash
equilibrium exists whether or not there is a common value. In general, as in Ansolabehere
and Snyder (2000), equilibria exist when there is a common value larger than the measure of
disagreement among voters. The common value also parameterizes by how far can the winning
candidate offer a divergent platform from the generalized median.
With asymmetric information, I assume that the election is repeated in each period with
the same set of candidates/parties. I show that it has an outcome even if both candidates
appear ex-ante identical to voters and compete in a multidimensional space. The reason is that
electoral competition and the repetition of the election determine that, even if the high-quality
candidate is not observable to voters, candidates are forced to reveal it. Thus, the model is an
example of how to pick candidates in the presence of imperfect information (see Fearon, 1999).
I construct a repeated election where prospective voting (picking the best of two observably
identical candidates) and retrospective voting (past utility achieved with one of them) behavior
interact. As the election is repeated, voters can put a candidate at a disadvantage if in the
past he signaled being of higher quality and was not. This future disadvantage faced by the
candidate is sufficient to ensure he never takes such action and, therefore, present signals are
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fully informative.
Ferejohn (1986) is the first model with unobservable qualitative differences among candi-
dates, as Rogoff (1990). Banks and Sundaram (1998) study a model with both adverse selection
and moral hazard. What sets this model apart from theirs is competition on many issues at
a time, and refocusing information revelation on both the incumbent and challenger. In the
above literature, only the incumbent can signal his worth. In this model the challenger party
is present across periods (as in U.S. Presidential elections) and this forces it whether or not to
commit its efforts to win the current election. If it does not, it can take a chance and wait for
the next election, but it always implicitly signals its choice.
The literature on observable qualitative differences among candidates has received new
impetus with the theoretical work of Aragones and Palfrey (2002) and Groseclose (2001), and
the experimental work of Aragones and Palfrey (2004). Their research builds on a long line
of empirical work analyzing elections in the United States, e.g. Jacobson and Kernell (1981),
Kiewiet (1983), and Krasno (1994). The seminal analysis on candidate qualitative differences
of any kind is Stokes (1963).
The next section presents the model. Section three presents the equilibria when the high-
quality candidate is publicly known, section four when it is only known by candidates.
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The Spatial Model
Consider an election with two candidates labelled P = {D,R}. Candidates can offer any
platform in a multidimensional space X ⊆ <n, but must offer it with certainty, i.e. we only
consider pure strategies. Candidates only care for winning, with benefit b if they do. When
they tie each has an equal probability of winning.
Voters have to pick among the two candidates. Each voter i from the set I has an ideal
point i ∈ I. The set of ideal points I ⊂ X is fixed and common knowledge, i.e. all candidates
and voters know voters’ ideal points. In the election there is a random variable S ⊆ < that
determines voters value one candidate more than the other. All voters value this random
variable in common and the distance of its realization, s, from 0 is the measure of value: R
is “better” by s2 if s > 0, D is “better” by s2 if s < 0. For simplicity, I assume that the
conditional expectations of s on each side from 0 are equal: E [s|s > 0] = −E [s|s 6 0] = µ.
No candidate or voter observes the actual realization of s, but only a signal of it. With
perfect information (section 3) I assume that candidates and voters observe the same signal
σ, which is perfectly informative but qualitative. That is, σ tells without error whether s is
positive or non-positive, but not by how much it differs from zero:
Pr (σt > 0|st > 0) = Pr (σt 6 0|st 6 0) = p = 1.
With imperfect information (section 4) candidates observe the signal σ of s, but voters do not
observe anything. In this case, voters can only infer what candidates have learned by observing
their actions. 2
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Voters’ preferences are quadratic and additive, so if p is the candidate elected, they are
U (xp; (i, s)) = − kxp − ik+
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
s2
if s > 0 and p = R, or
if s 6 0 and p = D.
0
if s 6 0 and p = R, or
if s > 0 and p = D.
Thus, candidates and the bundle that consists of their platform and their relative quality
according to s, are one and the same thing.
For voter i, vi ∈ [0, 1], where vi = 0 indicates voting for candidate D, vi = 1 for R, and
vi ∈ (0, 1) a mixed strategy. I also assume that for a particular voter, if he is indifferent between
both candidates, he votes for the “better” one, in case he has some information on who that is.
With perfect information I consider pure strategy Nash equilibria but rule out those with
weakly dominated strategies. With imperfect information I consider pure strategy perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibria and also rule out those with weakly dominated strategies.
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Results with Perfect Information
In the election both candidates are free to make any offer in positional space but one of the
candidates is endowed with a qualitative advantage that can be zero (if it is, in this sense, we
are back to the standard Downsian case). When it is different from zero, one candidate differs
from the other in the ability to provide utility to constituents. In political science this quality
or ability is known as a “valence-issue” (see Stokes, 1963) and, in this section, I consider it
is observable. The issue creates a wedge between platforms and the final utility voters obtain
in the sense that voters obtain utility over and above the platform offered by the high-quality
candidate just by electing him.
The Game
First, nature picks a realization of s and the signal σ is observed by candidates and voters.
Then each candidate is free to offer the bundle in X he will implement if elected (commitment
is credible, as candidates just want to win). Third, voters vote, and the winner is determined
by majority rule and implements the policy he ran for. Finally, payoffs are realized.
A Measure of Voter Disagreement in Multidimensional Space
It is useful to first analyse the case when voters do not expect any candidate to be any
“better” than the other. That is, when they expect candidates to be qualitatively indifferent
and the election has no Common Value (µ = 0). In this case, there is still the space X, that
has more than one dimension. This means that, in general, for any given voter distribution, it
has more than one median hyperplane. With circular preferences, there is a one to one relation
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between each majority and each median hyperplane, as each median hyperplane represents
each possible majority that can be formed in this space. In this case, a well known condition
for existence states that an equilibrium exists if and only if there is a point where all median
hyperplanes intersect Davis et al. (1972). The reason is that, otherwise, for any point one
considers, there is always a majority, defined by the median hyperplane to which this point
does not belong, that prefers some other point. To state this condition it is necessary to
introduce more notation.
Given the set of points I, call M (I) its set of median hyperplanes in X. That is, for any
x0 ∈ X and a ∈ <, define M (x0,a) = {y ∈ X|y · x0 = a}. So M (x0,a) is an n− 1 dimensional
hyperplane inX. Then the hyperplaneM (x0,a; I) is a median hyperplane if |{i ∈ I|i · x0 < a}| 6
|I|
2
and |{i ∈ I|i · x0 > a}| > |I|
2
. For simplicity I drop the indexation for a median hyperplane
and just refer to M ∈M (I) as a median hyperplane.
For each point x ∈ X and each median hyperplane M inM (I), call d (x,M) the distance
between x and M ∈ M (I), i.e. d (x,M) = min
m∈M∈M(I)
kx−mk. Then define the maximum
distance between x and any median hyperplane as dmax (x; I) = max
M∈M(I)
d (x,M) .
The first result in this paper restates the condition of Davis et al. (1972) in the following
way: a point is an equilibrium if and only if its distance to any median hyperplane is zero.
Theorem 1 When µ = 0, (xD,xR) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if dmax (xD = xR; I) = 0.
The theorem states that, in the absence of a common value, a policy is an equilibrium if
and only if its measure of disagreement among voters is zero. Note that, in this equilibrium,
both candidates must tie.
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It follows that when the distribution of voters’ ideal points satisfies the well-known Plott
(1967) conditions, there is a point that belongs to all median hyperplanes, i.e. min dmax (x; I) =
0. Thus, it is important to know whether, for a given voter distribution, there is a point such
that dmax (x; I) = 0. The Plott distance gives the answer, as it tells exactly how distant is a
given distribution from having an equilibrium when s = 0.
Definition Given a set of voter ideal points I, its Plott distance is min dmax (x; I).
For simplicity, I drop the I indexation fromM (I) and min dmax (x; I), so they becomeM
and min dmax (x): it is understood that the set of median hyperplanes and the Plott distance
are particular to each voter distribution (or set of ideal points I).
When there is no common value in the election, when no candidate is expected to be
“better”, voters are personally indifferent among the two candidates. All they care for is the
policy closest to their ideal point in X. Instead, when voters expect the difference in quality
between candidates, s, to be different from zero their behavior is altered. Now they face a
tradeoff between picking the high-quality candidate and picking the candidate that offers a
policy closest to their ideal point in X. This tradeoff is what we analyze next. For the purpose
of simplicity I will assume that s 6 0. This analysis is without loss of generality. When s > 0,
an analogous condition holds.
The Election with a Common Value, µ > 0
Assume voters observe σ 6 0 and they expect candidate D to be of higher-quality, as
µ > 0. Then, when a voter compares the offers between both candidates, she will bear in
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mind that candidate D is the “better” candidate. This means that for every policy in space X
candidate D offers, it is as if he were µ closer to every voter than the other candidate. That is,
a particular voter will vote for D as long as the policy he offers, xD, is not further away from
her ideal point than the policy candidate R offers, xR, plus µ.
To find an equilibrium we need to consider the voting decisions of all voters. Remember
that the median hyperplanes represent each majority we can consider in space X. So, in
particular, if the policy candidate D offers in X, xD, is not further away than µ from every
median hyperplane, he is a sure winner. In other words, candidate D is a sure winner if
µ− dmax (xD) > 0.
The converse is also true: only policies in X offered by candidate D not further away from
some median hyperplane than the distance µ, are an equilibrium. Otherwise, candidate R can
offer a policy that wins. However, this policy is not an equilibrium either. The following result
is proved in Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) in a different setting. Though cast for circular
preferences, an analogous result holds for any strictly quasi-concave preference (see Figure 1).
Theorem 2 When µ > 0, and s 6 0
(xD,xR) is a Nash Equilibrium if and only if dmax (xD) 6 µ.
The theorem states that a policy is an equilibrium if and only if the common value is larger
than the measure of disagreement in multidimensional space.
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Proof of Theorem 2. (1) For a voter, electing candidate D is equivalent to electing a
bundle x that satisfies µ − dmax (x) > 0 and is expected to bring µ extra utility. Instead,
electing candidate R is equivalent to electing an unrestricted bundle x, with no expectations
about it. Consider the equation U (xD; (i, s))−U (xR; (i, s)) = 0. It describes the set of voters
indifferent between D and R and defines a hyperplane in <n orthogonal to the vector xR−xD.
(2 - Sufficiency) Choose the origin and coordinate vectors in <n so that xD = (0, 0, ..., 0),
xR = (xR1, 0, ..., 0), and xR1 > 0. For any z =(z1, ..., zn) ∈ X, define z1 (xR1) as the implicit
function derived from [µ2 − kxD − zk]− [− kxR − zk] = 0. Note that z1 (xR1) is increasing, and
min z1 (xR1) = µ.
For a voter i with ideal point i = (i1, ..., in), xD is preferred to xR if and only if i1 6 z1 (xR1),
otherwise he prefers xR. The same comparison can be made referring to the median voter
defined by the hyperplane Myx ∈ M orthogonal to xR − xD, with intersection (m, 0, ..., 0). If
this median voter prefers xD, xD wins for sure, otherwise xR wins. To put it differently, xD
wins with probability 1 if and only if m 6 z1 (xR1). If dmax (xD) 6 µ this is true:
m = d (xD,Myx) 6 dmax (xD) 6 µ 6 z1 (xR1) .
As xR is arbitrarily picked, xD wins against any policy offered by candidate R.
(3 - Necessity) Suppose not, suppose that dmax (xD) > µ and let M ∈M be the (or one of
the) median hyperplane(s) such that this is true. Then there is a policy xR ∈ M preferred by
a majority (the one defined by M) to xD.
Note that the theorem only restricts the policy of the high-quality candidate and it states
that he wins for sure. Moreover, what makes the inequality weak is the indifference-breaking
rule.
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I now consider the set of winning policies, which I call C, and compare it to the set of
Pareto Optima, which I call PS.
The Set of Winning Policies
I call C the set from which the “better” candidate can pick a bundle and win for sure when
σ is observed by candidates and voters
Definition C = {x ∈ X s.t. dmax (x) ∈ [min dmax (x) , µ]}, with boundary bC.
It is immediate to note that when C is non-empty it is centered at argmin dmax (x). This
is the sense in which the set of winning policies is centered at a generalized median.
Definition The generalized median is argmin dmax (x).
Note that the generalized median becomes the median when points are aligned (i.e. the
one-dimensional case) and it always exists, even though it need not be a Nash equilibrium
(when C is empty).
Another property of C is that it is convex. Moreover, the proof used below is a way to
find and construct C in general (and it is used for the examples later on).
Proposition 1 C is convex.
Proof of Proposition 1. For each median hyperplane construct a hyperplane parallel
to it at a distance µ on the side closest to argmin dmax (x). Consider the set that contains
argmin dmax (x) and all points bound by such parallel hyperplanes. This set is convex, as it is
bound by hyperplanes. Moreover, no point inside this set does not belong to C. It is precisely
C.
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Welfare
With Euclidean preferences it is well known that the set of Pareto optima is the convex
hull of the ideal points.
Proposition 2 The set of Pareto optimal policies is the convex hull of the ideal points.
PS =
(
x ∈ X s.t. x =
X
i∈I
λiii,
X
i∈I
λi = 1, and λi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i
)
.
It should be intuitive that, when the set of possible equilibria, C, is non-empty it always
intersects the set of Pareto optima, PS, as the generalized median belongs to the convex hull
of the ideal points. That is, when equilibria exist, some are Pareto optimal. However, when
the set C is sufficiently large, not all equilibria are Pareto optimal.
Proposition 3 (i) When µ− dmax (x) > 0, some equilibria are Pareto optimal, and (ii) when
µ− dmax (x) >> 0, not all equilibria are Pareto optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) To prove that, if C 6= ∅, PS ∩C 6= ∅, all we need is to prove
that argmin dmax (x) ∈ PS. Consider only the set of median hyperplanes that intersect at least
two ideal points:
i.i if there is only one such median hyperplane, then argmin dmax (x) belongs to it and is in
between at least two other ideal points.
i.ii if there is more than one such median hyperplane, then argmin dmax (x) belongs inside the
convex figure bound by this set of median hyperplanes.
(ii) For a given set of voter ideal points I, PS is fixed. Instead, C increases with µ.
The next subsection analyzes the bounds of the set C.
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Bounds of the winning set
From Theorem 2 we know that an equilibrium exists if and only if C is non-empty. The
problem is that it is difficult to understand if this condition is restrictive or not, as min dmax (x)
depends on the particular distribution of voters considered. That is, we do not know if it is
very demanding to assume that the common value µ is larger than min dmax (x). Also, when
C is non-empty, we do not know how large it will be. In this subsection we relate the Plott
distance to a geometric approach to find out how large is min dmax (x).
Consider the ‘yolk’ (McKelvey, 1986). This is defined as the smallest closed ball in X that
intersects all median hyperplanes. Define r, cy, and by as its radius, center, and boundary,
respectively. The following proposition shows that the radius equals the Plott distance.
Proposition 4 (i) r = min dmax (x) , and (ii) cy = argmin dmax (x) .
Proof of Proposition 4. The radius of the smallest ball centered at any x ∈ X that
intersects all median hyperplanes equals dmax (x). Such radius is greater or equal than r.
Let us now find how large is the Plott distance, or the radius of the yolk, in general. Feld
et al. (1988) prove the following two results.
Proposition 5 The radius of the yolk is (i) at most one half of the radius of any ball which
includes all voter ideal points, and (ii) is bounded above by the radius of a ball including a
majority of the voter ideal points.
The reader must judge for him- or herself if these conditions imply a large value of the
Plott distance relative to the distances between voters’ ideal points.
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To provide some intuition about the Plott distance, and the sets C, and PS beyond these
general results, the following two subsections consider some examples of voter distributions
used in the voting literature.
A One-dimensional Example
Figure 2 shows three voter ideal points, i1, i2, and i3, aligned in space. Voter two is the
median, and that would be the single Nash equilibrium in the absence of a common value, i.e.
a high-quality candidate. In other words, it is immediate to show that min dmax (x) = 0 and
i2 =argmin dmax (x). If we introduce a common value µ as shown in the figure, the high-quality
candidate can diverge from the median by as much as µ and still be elected. Finally, the figure
shows that the set of Pareto optima is the set of points in between all ideal points.
Note that only when voters preferences are circular and ideal points are aligned it is not
binding to only consider policies on the line where ideal points lie (i.e. a one-dimensional space).
Instead, it is binding if voter preferences are not circular. In this case, even if ideal points are
aligned, the median is generally not a Nash equilibrium, unless policies are restricted to the
one-dimensional space represented by the line where ideal points lie. 3
Two Multidimensional Examples
Figures 3 and 4 show two well-known examples of voter distributions defined on a plane.
For instance, Figure 3 is found in chapter 5 of Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) and Figure
4 in McKelvey (1986). The figures show how large is min dmax (x) for these two examples,
respectively. Figure 5 shows, at a smaller scale, how the Plott distance varies as the ideal points
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of voters from Figure 3 become aligned. In the limit, they are identical to the distribution in
Figure 2, and hence the Plott distance is zero.
Figures 6 and 7 compare the Plott distance to the distances between voters’ ideal points.
They emphasize the intuition born out of the Plott conditions: distances between ideal points
are not relevant to determine min dmax (x), but the distances between median hyperplanes are.
In figures 8 and 9 I assume a particular value of µ such that, for these two voter distri-
butions, I can draw C, as it is non-empty. That is, I opt for a value of µ such that µ −min
dmax (x) > 0 and a Nash Equilibrium exists in the election. In particular, in Figure 8 I first
show the assumed value of µ and then construct hyperplanes parallel to the median hyperplanes
at precisely that distance. The set C arises as the set bound precisely by these hyperplanes.
From the figure it is obvious that only when µ−min dmax (x) is greater or equal than zero is the
set non-empty. The distribution of the second example defines many more median hyperplanes
than the first. For this reason, in Figure 9 only the set of hyperplanes parallel to the median
hyperplanes at the assumed distance µ is shown. As in Figure 8, the set C arises naturally
as the set precisely bound by these hyperplanes. The generalized median, argmin dmax (x), is
shown for both examples.
Finally, Figure 10 takes the first example and compares PS to the set C depending on µ.
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Results with Imperfect Information
With imperfect information the game is one in which one candidate has an expected quali-
tative advantage but it is not observable. To make information revealed I consider a repetition
of the above game. I assume that over time the underlying quality of candidates changes ran-
domly. Depending on economic, political, and social conditions, the high-quality recipe held by
a party today can become its low-quality defining characteristic tomorrow, and viceversa. Can-
didates are identified with political parties and have preferences for winning intertemporally.
The high-quality candidate has to signal his ability and in equilibrium it must be informative
(i.e. the other candidate cannot signal that he is able too). That is, for the high-quality can-
didate to communicate his worth, the other candidate cannot profit from creating noise and
distorting his signal. If candidates/parties have a high preference for winning across time rather
than the one-shot present election, the present signal will be informative. The low-quality party
of today realises that in the future he might be the high-quality alternative, and will not want
to risk distorting the mechanism through which information is revealed today.
The Game
At each period t an election is held. Within it, first nature picks a realization of st and
candidates observe σt and voters do not. Each candidate then offers the platform he will
implement if elected. Third, voters try to infer the sign of s from candidates’ actions, vote, and
the winner is elected by majority rule implementing the policy he ran for. Finally, payoffs are
realized and voters infer the quality of the winner by calculating the difference between their
payoff and the payoff from the winning platform itself.
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I examine the equilibria of the game where the above election is repeated in each period.
Candidates and voters discount the future at a common discount rate δ, the realization of s in
each period is independent of all others, and it is equally likely that s is positive or non-positive:
Pr (st|st−1) = Pr (st) , and Pr (st > 0) = Pr (st 6 0) .
This stochastic process ensures the election is well-defined as a repeated game: the payoff
structure of the game is unaltered by agents’ actions.
A Fully Revealing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Strategies and beliefs
Let xjt : S ×H → X be the pure strategy of candidate j = D,R upon observing state
st, given a history ht. Let ϕt : (X×X) ×H → [0, 1] be the belief function of voters, i.e. the
probability they believe candidateR is high-quality after observing candidates’ offers (xDt,xRt),
given a history ht. Finally, the strategy of a voter is a mapping vit : (X×X)×H→ [0, 1].
Strictly speaking, as a voter does not observe the signal σ, she does not have a preferred
bundle, but a preferred bundle conditional on her belief of the sign of s. To keep things simple,
I will avoid using the conditional expectation notation, and just name her conditional preferred
bundle (i, ϕ), and (xp, p) the bundle implemented.
The Equilibrium
Theorem 3 There is a δ and an assessment {x∗Dt,x∗Rt, ϕ∗t , {v∗it}}∞t=0 such that, in equilibrium,
(i) the high-quality candidate is elected as (ii) he implements a policy in C, and (iii) voters
infer the sign of s.
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The Fully Revealing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium described above is constructed assuming
a discount rate of voters and candidates δ larger than some minimum δ∗ and an assessment
that ensures that the high-quality candidate offers a particular policy in C and his behavior
is not imitated. That is, in each period t, the high-quality candidate offers a particular point
x ∈ C, the other candidate offers a different point, and the high-quality candidate is elected.
Intuition
With imperfect information this is a signaling game between the candidates and the elec-
torate and platforms are not just offers, but also signals to voters. Thus, for a candidate to
signal his worth, a discontinuity on the set of beliefs must be created endogenously depend-
ing on the platforms offered. However, if the Plott distance is not zero, this is not trivial. If
voters hold a belief equal to the prior after some deviation in a subgame, we are not sure an
equilibrium exists in the subgame, precisely because the Plott distance is positive, and both
candidates appear identical.
To make information revealed I assign two sets of points to each candidate. These sets
are constructed so that if one of them offers a platform belonging to the set he is assigned, it
is seen as a signal that he is the high-quality candidate. Both sets of points are different, so
candidates cannot be confused by sitting on top of each other: if a candidate does not offer a
platform from his assigned set he is not signaling he is the high-quality type. Then, I pick the
two sets of platforms such that all points in one of the sets beat parwise those in the other, in
case voters hold a belief equal to the prior. Thus, if both candidates try to signal they are the
high-quality one, one always wins.
Finally, from the two sets of points above, voters can potentially keep on assigning the
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“bad” set of points to a candidate across periods, if in the previous period he decided to signal
he was high-quality when he was not. If they do this, then the other always has an incentive
to signal he is the high-quality candidate. With this assignment of sets voters can enforce past
deviations from the fully revealing equilibrium path. Then no candidate has an incentive to
deviate and signal he is high when he is not in the first place and the above assignment that
puts a candidate at a disadvantage is just an out of equilibrium observation.
Figure 11 shows two examples of the above sets of points for each candidate when the
distribution of voter ideal points is as in Figure 3. It is obvious to notice that one can always
find such pairs of sets, as long as the set C has a positive measure, i.e. as long as µ > min
dmax (x). Figure 12 shows what is observed in the equilibrium path of the game. Finally, Figure
13 shows how the one-dimensional case would look.
Proof of Theorem 3. 1. Argument
In each period t, pick two sets of points in C, Zt and Z0t with Zt 6= Z0t, and assume that
if the same candidate were to offer points from both, all points in Zt would be preferred by a
majority to all those in Z0t:
I.- Assign each from {Zt,Z0t} to the candidates with the following rule: (i) if in the last election
the high-quality candidate was elected, assign {Zt,Z0t} arbitrarily to any candidate; (ii) if in
the last election the high-quality candidate was not elected, in the next N∗ periods assign Zt
to the high-quality candidate and Z0t to the winner in that election.
II.- Consider the following set of beliefs for a voter: (i) if no candidate sits at any point in his
assigned set from {Zt,Z0t} my belief is equal to my prior. That is, I believe both candidates are
equally likely to be high-quality. (ii) If one candidate sits at any point in his assigned set from
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{Zt,Z0t} and the other sits anywhere else but his, I believe that the high-quality candidate is
him sitting at his assigned set. (iii) If both candidates sit at any point in their assigned set
from {Zt,Z0t}, my belief equals the prior.
III.- The strategy of a candidate when he observes the realization of the state is: offer any policy
in my assigned set from {Zt,Z0t} when I am the high-quality candidate, offer any other when I
am not.
IV.- Finally, the strategy of a generic voter i ∈ I is: vote for him who gives me highest utility,
conditional on whom I believe is the high-quality candidate.
2. Discussion
In general, in this multidimensional policy space, when voters hold a belief equal to their
prior, we are not assured an equilibrium exists. However, the argument above ensures that the
high-quality candidate always wants to sit at a point in his assigned set from {Zt,Z0t}. Thus,
voters would only hold their prior belief if the candidate inconsistent with the observed signal
σ imitated the high-quality candidate and also sat at a point in his assigned set from {Zt,Z0t}.
In this case, an equilibrium exists: by assumption, all points in Zt beat those in Z0t. Thus,
the payoff of this subgame is well-defined. However, as voters assign the set Z0t for N
∗ periods
thereafter to this candidate (who imitates the high-quality candidate in that period), they are
assured that he will never want to take this path and imitate the high-quality candidate in
the first place. His action would be remembered for so many periods, benefitting the other
candidate at his expense, that he would not want to take it. This is constructed with the
following condition on δ∗ and N∗.
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3. Define δ∗ and N∗ such that
1
2
δ∗
1− δ∗ b > b +
1
2
δ∗
1− δ∗ (δ
∗)N
∗
b,
notice that δ∗ ∈
£
2
3
, 1
¤
. Given the assignment {Zt,Z0t}, this expression is the tradeoff the
candidate who is not the high-quality one faces. The left hand side of the expression is the
expected discounted payoff if he does not create noise, if he does not sit today at a point in his
assigned set from {Zt,Z0t}. This is the fully revealing equilibrium path outlined in the argument
above. In all future elections this candidate expects to win half of the time. Instead, the right
hand side is the payoff he gets today if he creates noise, if he sits at a point in his assigned set
from {Zt,Z0t}. In this case he distorts the mechanism through which information is revealed.
In the present this candidate can at most win, but in the future he will lose for the next N∗
periods and then return to the fully revealing path thereafter.
4. Formal Construction
We now construct a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium assessment based on the argument above
with an assumed sufficiently large discount value.
Assume δ > δ∗ and the following assessment {x∗Dt,x∗Rt, ϕ∗t , {v∗it}} :
I.- Location of candidates that determine beliefs ( pt−1 is the previous period winner):
if
½
σt−1 > 0 and pt−1 = R, or
σt−1 6 0 and pt−1 = D,
¾
then let
©
xCDt,x
C
Rt
ª
∈ {Zt,Z0t} , with xCDt 6= xCRt;
if
½
σt−1 6 0 and pt−1 = R, or
σt−1 > 0 and pt−1 = D,
¾
then let
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
xCDt+k ∈ Zt
xCRt+k ∈ Z0t
if σt−1 6 0
xCRt+k ∈ Zt
xCDt+k ∈ Z0t
if σt−1 > 0
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
, for k = 0, ..., N∗,
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II.- Beliefs depending on the location of the candidates.
ϕ∗t =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if xRt = xCRt, xDt 6= xCDt,
0 if xDt = xCDt, xRt 6= xCRt,
1
2
otherwise,
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
III.- Strategies of candidates.
x∗Dt ∈
⎧
⎨
⎩
©
xCDt
ª
if σt 6 0
x ∈ X/
©
xCDt
ª
if σt > 0
⎫
⎬
⎭, x
∗
Rt=
⎧
⎨
⎩
©
xCRt
ª
if σt > 0
x ∈ X/
©
xCRt
ª
if σt 6 0
⎫
⎬
⎭,
IV.- Strategy of a generic voter.
v∗it =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
R if
½
U [(xRt, R) ; (i, ϕ∗t )] > U [(xDt,D) ; (i, ϕ
∗
t )], or
U [(xRt, R) ; (i, ϕ∗t )] = U [(xDt,D) ; (i, ϕ
∗
t )] and ϕ
∗
t >
1
2
,
D if
½
U [(xRt, R) ; (i, ϕ∗t )] < U [(xDt,D) ; (i, ϕ
∗
t )], or
U [(xRt, R) ; (i, ϕ∗t )] = U [(xDt,D) ; (i, ϕ
∗
t )] and ϕ
∗
t <
1
2
,
1
2
otherwise.
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Full Information Equivalence
In the proof of Theorem 3 we picked two arbitrary sets of points in C, Zt and Z0t, and all
we asked them to satisfy is to be different, and all points in one to beat the other’s. Thus, it
follows that all equilibria with perfect information can be generated with imperfect information.
Proposition 6 Equilibrium policies implemented with perfect information can be implemented
with imperfect information.
Proof of Proposition 6. All we require from Zt, Z0t is that one beat the other’s points
when voters’ beliefs equal the prior.
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Empirical Implications
This is a Downsian model, so a very strong tendency to converge to the median, the center
of the set C, lies in it. This is the case whether an equilibrium exists or not (i.e. whether C
is empty or not, as shown in McKelvey (1986)). However, the differences in quality between
candidates allow the high quality candidate to pick a policy that diverges from the median,
as long as it is not further away from it than his qualitative advantage minus the level of
disagreement among voters. Thus, whilst there are multiple equilibria and, thus, divergence
from the median, they are bounded precisely by the difference in the qualitative characteristic
of candidates.
The existence of multiple equilibria in this model should be seen as a plus: changes in policy
when a new candidate enters office can be unrelated to changes in the voting distribution, but
due to differences in the quality of the exiting and entering candidates.
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Discussion
This repeated election is an example of a mechanism voters can use to pick a candidate in
the presence of imperfect information (see Fearon, 1999). In this case, the mechanism is one
in which the disadvantage the “worse” candidate faces if he deviates out of the equilibrium
path, ensures a smooth selection of the “better” candidate in equilibrium in each period. That
is, the retrospective punishing behavior of voters in case candidates deviate ensures a smooth
prospective voting behavior in equilibrium.
The election has a number of features that make it attractive. First of all, it is a model
that can explain electoral competition in a multidimensional space. Second, it predicts platform
divergence along the lines defended in Stokes (1963): differences in candidate quality allow for
divergence without any change in the voting distribution. Moreover, the election has a clear
value added: it is a mechanism to reveal the “better” candidate and elect him if he is moderate
enough relative to his worth. This is because party competition in a repeated election context
is sufficiently powerful to make all information revealed. Finally, it also shows that a candidate
who is much preferred to another can can win implementing policies that are not Pareto optimal:
even if all information is revealed, outcomes are not necessarily efficient.
In its current state the model has two disadvantages, however. It predicts that in all
equilibria the “better” candidate will win with probability one. Moreover, the position of the
loser remains indeterminate, as he just does not want to be seen as the “better” candidate. For
this reason, I plan to extend the model to have imperfect information in the sense mentioned in
the paper. Voters, instead of being endowed with a perfect signal at the end of every election,
will get an imperfect signal, i.e. one that is informative but not with unit probability. It is
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expected that this weakening of the information structure in the model will allow to get rid of
the two disadvantages mentioned above.
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Notes
1. Candidates differ in quality just as workers differ in productivity.
2. A note on imperfectly informative signals (p < 1): when information revelation is on the
side of candidates, the purpose of analyzing them is not evident. In any election the number
of candidates is always relatively small, so the amount of information they hold collectively
always remains imperfectly informative.
3. I thank David Austen-Smith for making this point.
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Do elections make candidates
reveal information?
Can elections aggregate
information held by voters ?
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Figure 1. Being general
Figure 2. A one dimensional example
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the convex interval containing all ideal points.
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Figure 3. Multidimensional example 1
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Figure 4. Multidimensional example 2
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Figure 5. The one dimensional example
as a limit of multidimensional example 1
The Plott distance, min dmax(x),
as the ideal point i3 aligns with i1 , i2.
In the limit, the Plott distance is zero
and we are in the one dimensional case.
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points for multidimensional example 1
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the ideal Points (represented by the convex hull).
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Figure 7. The distances between ideal
points for multidimensional example 2
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Figure 8. The set of equilibria, for a given qualitative
advantage µ, for multidimensional example 1
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Figure 9. The set of equilibria, for a given qualitative
advantage µ, for multidimensional example 2
i2
i3
i1
There are always equilibria that are Pareto optimal, but
not all need be (the set of equilibria is shown for two
values of µ - in case 2 some, but not all, are optimal).
•
•
•
Convex Hull
- Set of Pareto optima -
1 2
Figure 10. The set of Pareto Optima
for multidimensional example 1
Figure 11. An example of Z and Z’
for multidimensional example 1
set Z
•
• •
set Z’
In a pair-wise comparison, all points in the set Z beat
all points in the set Z’, if voters hold the prior belief.
Figure 12. Observed actions, when there is imperfect
information, in multidimensional example 1
•
In Equilibrium
Voters only observe
one candidate sitting
at a point in Z or Z’.
The other is indeterminate.
Say st > 0, R is then
the high-quality candidate,
and he offers an xRt ∈ Z’. 
Figure 13. Figures 11 and 12
for the one dimensional example
•••
set Z’set Z
•
Say st > 0, R is then the
high-quality candidate
and he offers an xRt ∈
Z’.
Example :
In a pair-wise comparison, all points in the set Z beat
all points in the set Z’, if voters hold the prior belief.
In Equilibrium :
Voters only observe one candidate sitting at a point in Z or Z’,
the other is indeterminate.
